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It seems natural to suppose that the burgeoning field of  critical phenomenology would 
come to bear at least some affinities or resemblances (whether implicitly or explicitly) to 
critical theory, insofar as both are deeply concerned with directing a rigorous critical eye 
towards the most pressing political, economic, cultural, and social issues of  our time.1 
Yet critical theory has also had its share of  critics of  phenomenology itself, not least of  
which was the foremost member of  the first-generation Frankfurt School critical theorists, 
Theodor W. Adorno. Adorno’s critique of  phenomenology was, for historical reasons, 
confined to Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger, and might be concisely put as follows: 
for Adorno, classical phenomenology is insufficiently critical towards contemporary realities 
of  oppression and domination (an insufficiency variously attributed to an alleged pernicious 
idealism, solipsism, methodological individualism, descriptivism, or ahistoricism in classical 
phenomenology).2 On this count, critical phenomenologists today may very well agree—at 
least to the point of  affirming that phenomenology’s critical potential remained largely 
“untapped” in its classical formulations. However, in a twist of  historical fate, Adorno failed 
to engage with a contemporaneous phenomenologist with whom he perhaps had more in 
common than anyone else: Emmanuel Levinas. Levinas himself  was also notably critical 
of  Husserl and Heidegger (while of  course also being enormously indebted to them), for 
reasons not altogether dissimilar to Adorno’s. For Levinas, phenomenology had hitherto 
neglected the fundamental ethical or moral dimensions of  experience—in particular our 
ethical responsibility towards the Other in the face of  the manifold evils and injustices of  
1 For existing work on the general relationship between critical phenomenology and critical theory, see 
Salamon (2018a) and Guenther (2020). The present paper builds on this work by drawing a detailed 
comparison between a specific phenomenologist (Levinas) and a specific critical theorist (Adorno), with 
the project of  critical phenomenology in mind.
2 For Adorno’s critique of  Husserl, see Adorno (2013). For Adorno’s critique of  Heidegger, see Adorno 
(2003). For a book-length account of  Adorno’s relationship to Husserl, Heidegger, and classical 
phenomenology (as well as existentialism), see Gordon (2016). A serious consideration of  the details of  
Adorno’s critique of  classical phenomenology exceeds the bounds of  the present paper. 
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the world.3 What might Adorno have thought of  Levinas’s work, and Levinas of  Adorno’s? 
What might they have learned from one another? And how might this exchange have 
affected the trajectories of  critical theory, phenomenology, or critical phenomenology?
 This article is motivated by the possibility that bringing Levinas’s phenomenology 
and Adorno’s critical theory into a mutually illuminating and enriching conversation can 
meaningfully contribute to the ongoing development of  critical phenomenology. Though 
a number of  studies have compared and contrasted these two thinkers from a variety of  
angles, I will take up a set of  themes that has not yet received direct and thorough attention: 
both thinkers’ central concern with a redemptive or messianic futurity, which provides 
the basis for what I will identify as a shared “critical eschatology.”4  In particular, I will 
argue that Levinas and Adorno’s respective critical eschatologies share three key features: a 
fundamental ethical responsibility toward that which exceeds systematization or totalization 
(the Other and the non-identical, respectively), a refusal of  philosophical theodicy in view 
of  the historical catastrophes of  the 20th century, and a foregrounding of  the “light of  
redemption” as the key methodological tool proper to the recognition of  the preceding 
concerns. (Of  course, there may be as many differences between Levinas and Adorno as 
there are similarities, and any full account of  the relation between these two thinkers would 
have to take both into account. If  this study emphasizes the similarities at the expense of  
a robust consideration of  the differences, it is only due to limitations of  space, and the 
general sense that these similarities are less obvious and less frequently remarked upon, thus 
warranting being drawn out here at length.) 
 In section one to follow, I consider Levinas’s and Adorno’s shared identification of  the 
inherent limits to philosophy’s systematizing or totalizing activities, affirming the radical 
alterity that surpasses these limits as the locus of  ethical responsibility. For Levinas, the 
Other constitutes an “infinity” that transcends every totality, and so perpetually overflows 
every thought that attempts to think it or conceptualize it. The ethical is precisely a 
matter of  responding to and caring for the Other in view of  its domination by the Same, 
gestures given expression not least by Levinasian phenomenology itself. For Adorno, the 
non-identical escapes every effort to grasp it in the terms of  identity (paradigmatically, 
conceptual thought). Giving voice to the suffering of  the non-identical under the grip of  
identity is a self-described condition for the truth of  Adorno’s critical theory. This above all 
comprises its profound ethical thrust. Just as Adorno’s theory of  the non-identical gives rise 
3 References throughout Levinas’s corpus would be too numerous to cite here, but it would be worth 
mentioning in this regard that Levinas’s critique of  Husserl and Heidegger had already begun in his 
earliest studies, e.g., Levinas (1995, 1998c). 
4 Existing work connecting and comparing Adorno and Levinas has taken up this connection and 
comparison via questions of  religion and theology (de Vries 2005), ethics and materiality (Nelson 
2020), and aesthetics (Smith 2006; Belmer 2019), among others. Particular attention has been paid to 
similarities and differences between Levinas and Adorno’s responses to the Holocaust (Eisenstadt 2006; 
Sachs 2011; Portella 2019). I take my emphasis on eschatology and redemption to offer a new perspective 
on the Levinas-Adorno relationship that nonetheless builds upon all of  these prior studies, to which I am 
indebted in innumerable ways. 
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to a negative dialectics, Levinas’s phenomenology of  the Other gives rise to a unique ethical 
variety of  negative theology: it is the “negativity” of  these two approaches that lends them 
their critical edge. 
 In section two, I consider Levinas and Adorno’s shared understanding of  the historical 
catastrophes of  the 20th century as delivering a definitive repudiation of  the traditional 
philosophical project of  theodicy (whether in its Leibnizian or Hegelian formulations, among 
others). With parallel biographies as European Jewish intellectuals born at the turn of  the 
century, Levinas and Adorno each identify the Holocaust (or Auschwitz, by metonymy) as a 
historical refutation of  any and every attempt to offer a comprehensive rational justification 
for human suffering. For Adorno, horror in the face of  the event of  Auschwitz grounds a 
new categorical imperative to prevent any comparable event from recurring; for Levinas, 
this event similarly poses a summons to an unconditional obligation toward the Other. In 
effect, theodicy is the archetype of  the perspective of  the Same or identity that attempts to 
assimilate all alterity, thus dominating the Other or the non-identical. To reject theodicy is 
to refuse reconciliation with an unjust present—this being the very meaning of  the “critical” 
outlook (whether critical phenomenology or critical theory), I claim—and instead opening 
a horizon of  anticipation for a redemptive future.
 In section three, I consider the ways in which both Levinas and Adorno take the 
standpoint of  this redemptive future to be the necessary condition of  possibility for a 
critical engagement with present injustice. Without offering any positive conception of  
such a future, this standpoint nevertheless shines a negative light through which we may 
see the manifold ways in which the current state of  affairs falls short. For Levinas, it is only 
an eschatology of  messianic peace that can break through and thereby expose the totality 
of  war—under which is included all forms of  violence and oppression. The messianic 
promise exerts its ethical force not through an awaiting of  its final fulfilment, but rather in 
the call it issues here and now to come to the aid of  the Other. For Adorno, only the light 
of  redemption (whose full meaning must await clarification below) can properly illuminate 
the world—with all its evil, depravity, and so on—such that it might be investigated by 
the critical theorist. This light offers a unique kind of  critical phenomenological “seeing,” 
allowing phenomena to appear in a way that reveals their implication in all manners of  
unjustifiable suffering. For both Levinas and Adorno, such seeing is simultaneously the 
simplest and the most difficult. The simplest, since there is perhaps nothing more evident 
than the immense suffering which engulfs the world, and the immense distance this world 
therefore stands from any possible or impossible redemption. The most difficult, since our 
very efforts to understand the world in the light of  redemption are themselves a part of  the 
unredeemed world—a fact with which any critical eschatology must itself  critically reveal 
and understand. The productive tension between these two conditions, I would argue, 
inevitably shapes the practice of  contemporary critical phenomenology. It is my hope that 
the close reading of  Levinas and Adorno in what follows will prove helpful in navigating 
this tension in critical phenomenological work today. 
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I. LEVINAS AND ADORNO’S NEGATIVE ETHICS
In this section, I examine and compare Levinas’s account of  our fundamental ethical 
responsibilities to the Other in Totality and Infinity with Adorno’s account of  our fundamental 
ethical responsibilities towards the non-identical in Negative Dialectics.5 Both exhibit what I 
will call—for reasons that will become clear—a “negative ethics,” which comes to serve as 
the ethical basis for a critical eschatology.
I.I LEVINAS: AN ETHICS OF THE OTHER
In Levinas’s (1969) Totality and Infinity, the two titular concepts are first presented in terms 
of  war and peace. Totality manifests in and as war, where individuals are reduced by force 
to serving functions within totalizing systems, compelled to carry out actions in which they 
do not recognize themselves and through which all higher values are annulled (21-22). 
In war, as in any totality, nothing is permitted to remain exterior: everything is violently 
reduced to the domination of  the Same. Philosophy encounters Being in the form of  war 
and, for that reason, totality is the dominant form of  philosophical thought. The totality 
of  war, Levinas maintains, can be overcome only through “the eschatology of  messianic 
peace,” whose truth exceeds philosophical evidences (Levinas 1969, 22). We will have to 
wait until section three to determine the precise contours of  Levinas’s messianism. But 
suffice it to say for the moment that the promise of  peace shines forth in the transcendence 
of  the face of  the Other, which Levinas expresses with the notion of  infinity. The Other qua 
infinite overflows any thought that attempts to think it: the Other is irreducible to the Same, 
and so forever exceeds the grasp of  philosophical or conceptual totalities. Of  course, the 
forces of  totalization nonetheless perpetually attempt to forcibly reduce the Other to the 
Same, from which attempts emerge all forms of  oppression, domination, subjugation, and 
so on—“war,” in a word (Levinas 1969, 21-30). 
 For Levinas, ethics denotes our responsibility towards the Other in light of  the threats 
of  such totalizations: in short, we are responsible for respecting the Other as infinitely other, 
and for alleviating those conditions in which the Other is not respected as such—a task that 
is itself  infinite. Levinas (1969) raises ethics to the status of  “first philosophy” (42-48, 302-
04), a gesture he takes to be unique in the history of  philosophy generally, but particularly 
within phenomenology, which (on Levinas’s account) privileged the theoretical over the 
practical in its classical forms. Nevertheless, Levinas sees in (Husserlian transcendental) 
phenomenology a certain invaluable openness to transcendence and exteriority, which he 
will come to recognize for the first time as ultimately that of  the Other (28-29). Levinas’s 
phenomenological ethics can be construed as “negative” in the precise sense of  negative 
5 Though the choice of  these two texts is somewhat arbitrary, they each strike me as the single most 
powerful and comprehensive articulation of  their authors’ positions and views available.  Interestingly, 
Totality and Infinity and Negative Dialectics were both originally published within a span of  five years in the 
1960s (1961 and 1966, respectively), after each of  their authors had already enjoyed long careers—
Levinas was in his mid-fifties, Adorno in his early sixties.
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theology, his occasional protests to the contrary notwithstanding. Levinas analogizes the 
Other both to the Cartesian God (the referent of  Descartes’s idea of  infinity) and to 
the Platonic “Good beyond Being,” which through Neoplatonism becomes the basis for 
the negative (apophatic) theological tradition of  the Middle Ages and beyond (Levinas 
1969, 25, 79-81, 102-05; Descartes 1996; Plato 2003, 508a-e).6 Who or what the Other 
“is” cannot be positively specified (for the Other exceeds Being itself), nor can our duties 
towards the Other be given any complete or systematic positive elaboration: we can only 
ethically encounter the Other in the phenomenological revelation of  the face, in which the 
Other’s very presence is marked by an indelible absence qua transcendence. 
I.II ADORNO: LENDING A VOICE TO SUFFERING
In Adorno’s (1973) Negative Dialectics, the titular negativity is first presented in terms of  the 
relation between identity and non-identity. For Adorno, philosophical thought as such is 
identity-thinking: the systematic effort to reduce all reality to the terms of  its own conceptual 
identities. Yet the non-identical forever exceeds any and every attempt to exhaustively 
systematize or conceptualize it. When identity-thinking runs up against the limitations of  
its own efforts to grasp the non-identical, it falls into dialectical contradictions. It is the 
project of  negative dialectics to rigorously uncover these contradictions without providing 
any positive resolution to them—for to do so would be to relapse into identity-thinking. 
Compelling non-identity to conform to identity is the form of  all oppression, domination, 
subjugation, and so on. Negative dialectics, if  it is anything, is the struggle against this 
conformity and compulsion (4-11). Adorno offers a related schema of  subject and object 
to get at much the same point: identity-thinking qua philosophical thinking has historically 
privileged the subject over the object, whereby the object is compelled to conform to the 
systematic conceptualizations and identifications of  the philosopher’s subjectivity. Against 
this, Adorno proposes a new priority of  the object: the object, as the non-identical, exceeds 
every effort to exhaustively subjectify it. The object “objects” to such subjectification (174-
92).
 The ethical thrust of  Adorno’s negative dialectics is given one of  its most powerful 
formulations with reference to the relation between subjectivity and objectivity: “The need 
to lend a voice to suffering is a condition of  all truth. For suffering is objectivity that weighs 
upon the subject; its most subjective experience, its expression, is objectively conveyed” 
(1973, 17-18). Critical theory (which I take to be synonymous with negative dialectics in the 
present context, this being Adorno’s chosen name for his own particular practice or brand 
of  critical theory) is precisely an effort to lend a voice to suffering, and only on this condition 
does critical theory possess any measure of  truth. Of  course, lending a voice to suffering 
is in service of  the struggle to eliminate such suffering. Following Adorno’s conception of  
the subject-object relation, the voice lent to suffering must always be unfinished, fallible, 
and so on. The objectivity weighing on the subject as suffering itself  exceeds any complete 
6 For work on Levinas and negative theology, see Fagenblat (2008) and Wolosky (2017).
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conceptualization or identification, requiring the negativity of  negative dialectics to be 
given proper expression. In other words, “[negative] dialectics is the ontology of  the wrong 
state of  things”: this is an ethical project insofar as it is in service of  bringing about the right 
of  state of  things (Adorno 1973, 11). Once again, this project is negative insofar as the right 
state of  things cannot be given a positive description in the midst of  the wrong state in 
which we live.7
I.III LEVINAS AND ADORNO:  
TOWARDS A CRITICAL PHENOMENOLOGICAL ETHICS 
Levinas and Adorno already seem to agree, strikingly, on a number of  points. For both 
Levinas and Adorno, our ethical responsibilities are directed towards that which exceeds 
philosophical or conceptual totalization or identification: the Other and the non-identical, 
respectively. Notice that in both cases this excess is a matter of  alterity or difference: non-
identity is what is other with respect to identity, while the Other is what is non-identical with 
respect to the Same. Again, in both cases, oppression and domination arise from the 
attempted forcible reduction of  this alterity: the reduction of  the Other to the Same, and of  
non-identity to identity. Our responsibility is accordingly to resist this reduction: to respect 
the Other as other and the non-identical as non-identical, and to struggle against conditions in 
which they are not so respected. These tasks are negative insofar as the irreducible alterity of  
the Other and the non-identical—and, by extension, our duties towards them—cannot be 
given an exhaustive positive description. As Adorno (1973) evocatively writes: “Materialism 
brought [the theological ban on graven images] into secular form by not permitting Utopia 
to be positively pictured; this is the substance of  its negativity. At its most materialistic, 
materialism [i.e., Adorno’s critical theory] comes to agree with theology” (207).8 As it turns 
out, the ban on graven images is equally Levinas’s stance towards the Other, whose reduction 
to the Same would be the form of  all idolatry; this is the substance of  the negativity of  
Levinas’s negative theology (see Levinas 1969, 294-98). At the risk of  an overstatement we 
might say that, at its most critical, Adorno’s critical theory comes to agree with Levinas’s 
phenomenology. 
 So, how might this agreement between Adorno’s critical theory and Levinas’s 
phenomenology contribute to the project of  a critical phenomenology? On the one hand, 
Adorno’s critical call to lend a voice to suffering can be given a distinctively phenomenological 
bent. A critical phenomenology of  suffering would strive to give voice to the weight of  
objectivity on the subject, as the most subjective experience of  the objective conditions of  
oppression and domination. The tools of  phenomenological description seem better suited 
than any to giving voice to these experiences qua experiences, insofar as such description is, 
7 For work on the “negativity” of  Adorno’s ethics, see Bernstein (2001) and Freyenhagen (2013).
8 For a book-length account of  Adorno and the “ban on images,” see Truskolaski (2020).
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I claim, the most attuned to the intricacies of  experience as such.9 On the other hand, 
Levinas’s phenomenological account of  the face of  the Other may supply an invaluable 
experiential ethical grounding to Adorno’s critical theory. A critical phenomenology open 
to the ethical encounter with the Other could profoundly witness and testify to the countless 
ways in which this openness is systematically blocked, obstructed, and so on. Of  course, 
what I ultimately want to suggest is that a critical phenomenological eschatology stands as 
the most promising point of  mutual illumination and enrichment between Levinas and 
Adorno. We have already seen that Levinas takes the respect for the Other to underwrite a 
vision of  messianic peace, and that Adorno takes the respect for the non-identical to herald 
the “right” state of  things—a “utopia” that cannot be positively pictured. But before we 
can get to the details of  this critical eschatology, we might first consider a concrete case of  
its opposite: namely, the oppression or domination of  the Other and the non-identical, and 
the totalizing philosophical outlook that fails to properly respond to this condition. 
II. LEVINAS AND ADORNO CONTRA THEODICY
In the previous section, I examined the “negative ethics” of  the Other and the non-identical 
at play in Levinas and Adorno. In this section, I take up the challenges to the classical 
philosophical project of  theodicy that follows from this ethics, with specific historical 
reference to the Holocaust (or Auschwitz, by metonymy, as per Adorno’s usage), which bore 
particular biographical significance for both Levinas and Adorno. As we will eventually see, 
it is their rejection of  theodicy that will come to open the horizon of  redemptive futurity 
constitutive of  a critical eschatology.10 
II.I LEVINAS AGAINST “USELESS SUFFERING”
Levinas was born in 1906 to a Jewish family in Lithuania, moving to France as a young 
man to undertake his philosophical studies. He served in the French military during the 
Second World War, spending most of  the war as a prisoner-of-war in Germany, where his 
POW status protected him from the Holocaust’s death camps. Maurice Blanchot managed 
to shelter Levinas’s wife and daughter (who had also been living in France) in a monastery, 
but the members of  Levinas’s family that had remained in Lithuania were not so fortunate: 
they were deported to the camps or killed by the SS (Malka 2006). The French dedication 
9 Here contemporary work in critical phenomenology on witnessing and testimony as ways of  “giving voice” 
to experiences of  suffering and oppression is crucially important: see Oliver (2001, 202) and Stauffer 
(2018).
10 Here again I am indebted to Eisenstadt (2006), Sachs (2011), and Portella (2019) for their accounts of  
Levinas and Adorno’s responses to the Holocaust. Each of  these accounts chooses to favor either Levinas 
or Adorno as providing the more valuable or profound response. I have left such a choice in suspension 
here.
                                                                  Levinas, Adorno, and the Light of Redemption  • 50Dylan Shaul
Puncta    Vol. 4.2    2021
to Levinas’s (1998b) second masterwork Otherwise than Being reads: “To the memory of  those 
who were closest among the six million assassinated by the National Socialists, and of  the 
millions on millions of  all confessions and all nations, victims of  the same hatred of  the other 
man, the same anti-semitism”—the Hebrew dedication then gives the names of  Levinas’s 
family members who perished (vii). Though Levinas offers many different reflections on 
these events over the course of  his career, some of  the most potent are contained in his 
essay “Useless Suffering”: 
Perhaps the most revolutionary fact of  our twentieth-century 
consciousness . . . is that of  the destruction of  all balance between 
Western thought’s explicit and implicit theodicy and the forms that 
suffering and its evil are taking on in the very unfolding of  this century. 
This is the century that in thirty years has known two world wars, the 
totalitarianisms of  right and left, Hitlerism and Stalinism, Hiroshima, 
the Gulag, and the genocides of  Auschwitz and Cambodia. This is 
the century that is drawing to a close in the obsessive fear of  the 
return of  everything these barbaric names stood for: suffering and 
evil inflicted deliberately, but in a manner no reason sets limits to, 
in the exasperation of  a reason become political and detached from 
all ethics. Among these events the Holocaust of  the Jewish people 
under the reign of  Hitler seems to me the paradigm of  gratuitous 
human suffering, in which evil appears in its diabolical horror. . . . 
The disproportion between suffering and every theodicy was shown 
at Auschwitz with a glaring, obvious clarity. (1998a, 97) 
Let us try to unpack this passage. “Theodicy” was first coined by G. W. Leibniz (1990) 
to denote the effort to justify the ways of  God to humanity—in particular, to explain the 
existence of  evil and suffering in the world in such a way that would render it compatible 
with God’s perfect goodness and justice. Though Leibniz may have introduced the term, 
Levinas rightly sees the theodicean impulse as characteristic of  the entirety of  the Western 
tradition from Plato to Hegel. Leibniz himself  argued that, since God is all-good, this world 
must be the best of  all possible worlds: whatever apparently unjustified evil or suffering we 
may encounter is in fact “for the best,” since God’s goodness requires that this world is the 
best possible. All evil and suffering must be in the service of  God’s higher purposes, even if  
we cannot understand them. 
 For Levinas, the historical catastrophes of  the 20th century have rendered any such 
project of  theodicy radically untenable and unconscionable. To attempt to justify the horrors 
of  the Holocaust by appeal to a “higher purpose” would be a desecration of  the memory of  
the victims; no purported justification could ever be proportionate to the suffering endured. 
The search for such justifications manifests the classical philosophical domination of  the 
Same and of  totality; all evil and suffering can be justified (so the philosopher of  the Same 
declares) once it is understood in terms of  its place in a totalizing system, which lends it 
a higher systematic purpose or meaning. But this precisely neglects the dimension of  the 
Other, and above all the suffering of  the Other. For Levinas, the desire to justify the suffering 
of  the Other is itself  the beginning of  all evil. The proper ethical response to suffering is 
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not to justify it, but to strive to eliminate it. Indeed, it is in the very essence of  the suffering 
of  the Other to be thoroughly “useless,” and thus lacking in any sufficient justification 
(Levinas 1998a, 91-94). Our witness to the terrifying suffering of  the 20th century—an 
utterly “gratuitous” suffering, a suffering beyond all reason and all limits—calls us to our 
responsibility towards the Other, and to the struggle to end the Other’s ongoing suffering. 
This call, we will see, is ultimately the eschatological call of  messianic peace: a peace that 
would spell the end of  useless suffering. 
II.II ADORNO AGAINST “RECONCILIATION” 
Adorno was born in 1903 to a Jewish family in Germany, beginning his academic career 
in the 1920s. By the 1930s, in light of  the rise of  Nazism, Adorno fled to England in exile, 
and subsequently to the United States. In 1949 he would return to Germany, where he lived 
out the rest of  his life (Müller-Doohm 2009). Adorno never ceased in his efforts to come to 
grips with the catastrophes that had transpired in the country and continent of  his birth. 
Indeed, he never ceased in his efforts to search for what it would mean to “come to grips” 
with catastrophes that were in their very essence unimaginable and unthinkable. Adorno 
(1973) maintained that it certainly could not mean extracting a positive meaning or “sense” 
from the events that would purportedly “reconcile” us to them: 
After Auschwitz, our feelings resist any claim of  the positivity of  
existence as sanctimonious, as wronging the victims; they balk at 
squeezing any kind of  sense, however bleached, out of  the victims’ 
fate. . . . The earthquake of  Lisbon sufficed to cure Voltaire of  
the theodicy of  Leibniz, and the visible disaster of  the first nature 
was insignificant in comparison with the second, social one, which 
defies human imagination as it distills a real hell from human evil. 
Our metaphysical faculty is paralyzed because actual events have 
shattered the basis on which speculative metaphysical thought could 
be reconciled with experience. (361-62)
No doubt the references to “speculative thought” and “reconciliation” here are directed 
primarily to Hegel (1975), who described his own philosophy of  history (the historical 
unfolding of  Spirit qua “second nature”) as a “theodicy” in the Leibnizian sense (42-43). 
For Hegel, history is a “slaughter-bench” on which individuals and nations are sacrificed 
for the sake of  the march of  Reason through history; when the philosopher comprehends 
the justified necessity of  these historical sacrifices, they become reconciled to them (69). 
For Adorno, Auschwitz marks the definitive repudiation of  any such account of  history. 
To attempt to justify the real Hell of  Auschwitz with reference to historical necessity, 
“squeezing” some perverse meaning out of  it, would be to infinitely defile and wrong the 
memory of  the victims.  
 In effect, such a historical theodicy amounts to the domination of  the non-identical by 
identity: whatever does not or cannot conform to the systematic rational necessity of  the 
historical process can be justifiably sacrificed. Negative dialectics must lend a voice to the 
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suffering that such domination invariably produces, as much as to the historical suffering 
that paralyzes our metaphysical faculties. Indeed, it is the suffering and disasters of  history 
that impose on us an ethical obligation to struggle against all such suffering: 
A new categorical imperative has been imposed by Hitler upon 
unfree mankind: to arrange their thoughts and actions so that 
Auschwitz will not repeat itself, so that nothing similar will happen. 
When we want to find reasons for it, this imperative is as refractory 
as the given one of  Kant was once upon a time. Dealing discursively 
with it would be an outrage, for the new imperative gives us a bodily 
sensation of  the moral addendum—bodily, because it is now the 
practical abhorrence of  the unbearable physical agony to which 
individuals are exposed even with individuality about to vanish as 
a form of  mental reflection. It is in the unvarnished materialistic 
motive only that morality survives. (Adorno 1973, 365)
The bodily sensation of  unbearable physical agony, not any transcendental deduction via 
pure practical reason, is now the materialist basis for morality, on Adorno’s view. Here is 
another way in which materialism and theology coincide: 
At its most materialistic, materialism comes to agree with theology. 
Its great desire would be the resurrection of  the flesh, a desire utterly 
foreign to idealism, the realm of  absolute spirit. . . . Only if  the 
physical urge were quenched would the spirit be reconciled and 
would become that which it only promises while the spell of  material 
conditions will not let it satisfy material needs. (Adorno 1973, 207). 
True reconciliation is achieved not, as Hegel believed, when we come to affirm the horrors 
of  history as justified necessities and sacrifices. Rather, it is only through the refusal of  any 
such affirmation, which alone can guide us toward the “resurrection of  the flesh” (foreign to 
idealism and absolute spirit, i.e., to Hegelianism): the satisfaction of  our material needs and 
the defeat of  all abhorrent bodily agony. Only with this future resurrection and redemption 
could we be truly reconciled (with ourselves, with each other, and with the world). 
II.III LEVINAS AND ADORNO: TOWARDS A REDEMPTIVE FUTURITY
Once again, the points of  agreement between Levinas and Adorno are striking. Both 
repudiate theodicy as wronging the victims of  historical injustices, recognizing the historical 
catastrophes of  the 20th century as definitively delivering this repudiation. Both reject the 
classical philosophical project of  rationally justifying past suffering, in favour of  the ethical 
project of  alleviating present suffering. The very horrors of  history that defy imagination 
call us to our responsibilities towards the Other (our “categorical imperative”), and to the 
difficult labour of  working towards a redeemed future in which the suffering and agony of  
the Other would be no more (an eschatological “resurrection”). The political, economic, 
and social world in which we live remains the very world that allowed and produced these 
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horrors, and which continues to produce them (in an occasionally less obvious fashion) in 
countless ways. Our responsibility is not to explain them away as necessary means to a 
higher end, but to ceaselessly struggle against the conditions of  their continued production 
and reproduction. 
 In a sense, this is what I take critical to mean, whether with reference to critical theory 
or critical phenomenology: the refusal of  reconciliation with an unjust present, the refusal 
of  justification for the suffering of  others, the refusal of  all conditions in which the Other is 
debased, degraded, or destroyed.11 Both Levinas and Adorno exemplify this critical outlook. 
A critical phenomenology premised on a cooperation of  insights from Levinas and Adorno 
would evince this same outlook twofold, insofar as it brings these two thinkers together.12 But 
how would such a critical phenomenology approach the phenomena under its investigation, 
given its criticality? Would it be simply “negative” in a narrow sense? Of  course, it would 
be affirmative insofar as it labours in the service of  justice, of  goodness, and of  a better 
world in a better future. Indeed, as we will see, both Levinas and Adorno maintain that it is 
precisely from the perspective of  this redemptive futurity that past and present unjustifiable 
suffering can be seen in the proper light, so as to engage in the critical struggle towards 
this redeemed future—a future that can only be conceived “negatively,” insofar as our 
unredeemed present (and its “ban on images”) precludes the positive construction of  the 
“right state of  things.” This light is the “light of  redemption,” and the critical approach it 
engenders is a critical eschatology.  
III. LEVINAS AND ADORNO ON THE LIGHT OF REDEMPTION
In section one, we examined Levinas’s and Adorno’s basic ethical positions concerning 
responsibility towards the Other and the non-identical, including the need to lend a voice 
to suffering. In section two, we saw how these ethical positions related to the historical 
events of  Levinas and Adorno’s own times: a rejection of  theodicy qua rational justification 
for unjustifiable human suffering, and a concomitant commitment to the struggle for a 
11 For reflections on the notion of  “critique” in contemporary critical phenomenology, see Salamon 
(2018a) and Guenther (2020). Guenther explains the political practice of  critical phenomenology with 
particular clarity and force: “As a political practice, critical phenomenology is a struggle for liberation 
from the structures that privilege, naturalize, and normalize certain experiences of  the world while 
marginalizing, pathologizing, and discrediting others. These structures exist on many levels: social, 
political, economic, psychological, epistemological, and even ontological. . . . As a transformative political 
practice, critical phenomenology must be beyond a description of  oppression, developing concrete 
strategies for dismantling oppressive structures and creating or amplifying different, less oppressive, and 
more liberatory ways of  Being-in-the-world. In other words, the ultimate goal of  critical phenomenology 
is not just to interpret the world, but also to change it” (15-16).
12 One might think that Adorno’s emphasis on the materiality of  bodily suffering would be incompatible 
with Levinas’s phenomenology, but in fact Levinas is a powerful phenomenological thinker of  embodiment 
(see Meskin 1993 and Guenther 2012).
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redeemed future in which such suffering would be eliminated. In this section (three), I 
explore the methods by which Levinas’s phenomenology and Adorno’s critical theory 
approach their objects of  investigation, in light of  the foregoing exposition. Both Levinas’s 
“messianic peace” and Adorno’s “messianic light”—i.e., the “light of  redemption”—allow 
us to see and investigate the evils and injustices of  the world with the critical eye necessary 
to work towards a better world, which might form the basis for a critical eschatology. 
III.I LEVINAS’S MESSIANIC PEACE
In the preface to Totality and Infinity, Levinas (1969) identifies the standpoint of  totality and 
the Same with war, and the opposing standpoint of  infinity and the Other with peace. With 
those identifications in mind, Levinas offers his most direct and powerful account of  their 
relationship and their import for his own phenomenological project in eschatological terms, 
which we will proceed to unpack in detail:  
Morality will . . . proclaim itself  unconditional and universal when 
the eschatology of  messianic peace will have come to superpose itself  
upon the ontology of  war. Philosophers distrust it. . . .  [F]or them 
eschatology—a subjective and arbitrary divination of  the future, the 
result of  a revelation without evidences, tributary of  faith—belongs 
naturally to Opinion. . . . But, when reduced to the evidences, 
eschatology would then already accept the ontology of  totality 
issued from war. Its real import lies elsewhere. It does not introduce a 
teleological system into the totality; it does not consist in teaching the 
orientation of  history. Eschatology institutes a relation with being 
beyond the totality or beyond history, and not with being beyond the past 
and the present. . . .  It is a relationship with a surplus always exterior 
to the totality, as though the objective totality did not fill out the true 
measure of  being, as though another concept, the concept of  infinity, 
were needed to express this transcendence with regard to totality, 
non-encompassable within a totality and as primordial as totality. 
This “beyond” the totality and objective experience is, however, not 
to be described in a purely negative fashion. It is reflected within 
the totality and history, within experience. The eschatological, as the 
“beyond” of  history, draws beings out of  the jurisdiction of  history 
and the future; it arouses them in and calls them forth to their full 
responsibility. . . .  It does not envisage the end of  history within 
being understood as a totality, but institutes a relation with the 
infinity of  being which exceeds the totality. . . . Without substituting 
eschatology for philosophy, without philosophically “demonstrating” 
eschatological truths, we can proceed from the experience of  totality 
back to a situation where totality breaks up, a situation that conditions 
the totality itself. Such a situation is the gleam of  exteriority or of  
transcendence in the face of  the Other. (22-24)
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Let us try to make sense of  this passage. Levinas maintains that the eschatology of  messianic 
peace must come to “superpose itself ” onto war. But what precisely does this superposition 
amount to? Traditionally, eschatology refers to divinely-revealed predictions or prophecies 
regarding the future eschaton or “end times,” in which history would be brought to an 
end by God’s final judgment; philosophers of  the Same naturally distrust such predictions 
(insofar as prophecy and revelation are taken to be non-philosophical), treating them as 
matters of  faith or opinion rather than of  philosophical truth. But for Levinas, the true 
significance of  eschatology is not a matter of  predicting any such definitive future. The 
superposition of  messianic peace onto the ontology of  war emphatically does not amount to 
the determination of  a teleological end to history qua totality. (Such a determination would 
have to be supported by various evidences, the necessity of  which would be tantamount to 
a capitulation to war and the Same). Rather, it requires the institution of  a relation beyond 
totality and history, which is nevertheless reflected within totality and history—namely, 
infinity. No totality can ever “fill out” the whole of  reality; there is always an excess of  the 
infinite that escapes it, and which, when reflected within it, can allow us to break up and 
break down the totality in question. In other words, the true meaning of  the messianic 
future described in eschatology is the call it issues to us here and now to take up our ethical 
responsibilities, drawing us out of  the domination of  totality and the Same towards the 
infinity of  the Other. 
 Indeed, though the infinite exceeds experience, it is equally reflected within experience, 
precisely in “the gleam of  exteriority or transcendence in the face of  the Other.” It is the 
gleaming light of  this transcendent face of  the Other that shines on totality, revealing its 
conditionality and sites of  breakdown. This light is the infinite messianic light: the light of  
the eschatology of  messianic peace. Though this light shines from beyond our experience 
(the Other is transcendent), it illuminates our experience in a certain way. Specifically, it 
illuminates the totality of  war (domination, oppression, etc.) in the service of  the possibility 
of  future peace: a peace in the name of  which we take up the present ethical struggle 
against war in all its forms. Levinasian phenomenology is precisely a phenomenological 
account of  experiences as illuminated by this light. Its eschatology does not guarantee a 
future messianic era “beyond” history, but rather institutes a redemptive futural orientation 
within history and experience—the opening of  history itself  to new and unknown futures. 
Such an orientation rouses us to identify and understand the totalities that besiege us, and 
break them up in the service of  and out of  our responsibility for the Other. 
III.II ADORNO’S LIGHT OF REDEMPTION
Adorno’s (2005) most powerful account of  the “light of  redemption” comes in the “Finale” 
to Minima Moralia, which I quote in full: 
The only philosophy which can be responsibly practised in face 
of  despair is the attempt to contemplate all things as they would 
present themselves from the standpoint of  redemption. Knowledge 
has no light but that shed on the world by redemption: all else is 
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reconstruction, mere technique. Perspectives must be fashioned 
that displace and estrange the world, reveal it to be, with its rifts 
and crevices, as indigent and distorted as it will appear one day in 
the messianic light. To gain such perspectives without velleity or 
violence, entirely from felt contact with its objects—this alone is the 
task of  thought. It is the simplest of  all things, because the situation 
calls imperatively for such knowledge, indeed because consummate 
negativity, once squarely faced, delineates the mirror-image of  
its opposite. But it is also the utterly impossible thing, because it 
presupposes a standpoint removed, even though by a hair’s breadth, 
from the scope of  existence, whereas we well know that any possible 
knowledge must not only be first wrested from what is, if  it shall hold 
good, but is also marked, for this very reason, by the same distortion 
and indigence which it seeks to escape. The more passionately 
thought denies its conditionality for the sake of  the unconditional, 
the more unconsciously, and so calamitously, it is delivered up to the 
world. Even its own impossibility it must at last comprehend for the 
sake of  the possible. But beside the demand thus placed on thought, 
the question of  the reality or unreality of  redemption itself  hardly 
matters. (Adorno 2005, 247)13
For Adorno, only a philosophy that would contemplate all things from the standpoint of  
redemption could be practised responsibly in our present despairing condition; a philosophy 
that dismissed this standpoint by denying the project of  alleviating the despair of  the world 
could not be responsibly practiced. But what precisely is entailed by this contemplation 
from the standpoint of  redemption? Redemption sheds a certain light on the world, which 
Adorno takes to be necessary for any knowledge about the world. This knowledge offers 
perspectives that render the world displaced and estranged by revealing a certain indigence 
and distortion therein (domination, oppression, injustice, etc.). Such distortion (“distorted” 
relative to the transparent clarity of  a redeemed world) would be visible only under the 
illumination of  the messianic light, i.e., only in an imagined retrospection from the standpoint 
of  a future redemption that would be free from these same qualities. The world needs this 
light, for it is itself  a world of  darkness qua suffering, despair, and so on; the suffering world 
seen only in its own darkness would fail to recognize the depths of  its own despair. In other 
words, it is only from the perspective of  a better world (even if  only conceived negatively) 
that we can understand the shortcomings of  the present one. The task of  thought is to 
acquire such displacing and estranging perspectives from “felt contact” with the “rifts and 
crevices” of  the objects of  examination—a task that is simultaneously profoundly simple 
and impossible. It is simple because the despair of  our condition is so blatant and total that 
its opposite (redemption) is equally clear, if  only negatively. It is impossible because the very 
knowledge fashioned in the light of  redemption would itself  be marked by the manifold 
imperfections of  the unredeemed world in which it is fashioned. Critical theory (to give 
13 For a helpful contemporary discussion of  this passage and similar ones throughout Adorno’s corpus, 
see Truskolaski (2020, 94-104).
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this knowledge a name) must also criticize itself  and its own complicity in the suffering of  
the world, for the sake of  the “possible”—that is, for the sake of  the possibility of  a future 
redemption, in whose light critical theory itself  sees what it sees.14
 The final sentence of  the “Finale” is remarkable: “But beside the demand thus placed 
on thought, the question of  the reality or unreality of  redemption itself  hardly matters” 
(Adorno 2005, 247). It is not the reality or the unreality of  redemption that Adorno cares 
most about, but rather the demand placed on thought by the very standpoint of  redemption 
and its messianic light. This is fundamentally an ethical demand, a moral imperative to see 
the world in the light of  redemption—whether or not we may in fact ever be redeemed, 
whether or not any such thing is truly conceivable. The futural orientation of  the standpoint 
of  redemption nonetheless demands that we confront the despair of  the present, the here 
and now, on which the messianic light shines. It is to present suffering that we must lend a 
voice, for the sake of  a better future. 
III.III LEVINAS AND ADORNO:  
TOWARDS A CRITICAL PHENOMENOLOGICAL ESCHATOLOGY
The commonalities between Levinas and Adorno on the interconnected thematics of  
eschatology, the messianic, and redemption are deep and profound. For both Levinas and 
Adorno, the standpoint of  a redemptive future (messianic peace or redemption) shines a 
necessary light on the present, illuminating it for phenomenological or critical analysis. The 
possibilities for a critical phenomenology on this basis seem to me especially promising. 
The illumination afforded by the light of  redemption is precisely an illumination of  the 
phenomena to be investigated by the critical phenomenologist who takes up the standpoint 
of  redemption to perform such an investigation. The particular way of  “seeing” in this light 
is a particular critical phenomenological mode of  observation and description, attuned 
precisely to phenomena of  oppression, domination, injustice, evil, and so on. Adorno’s call 
to displace and estrange the world by intimately attending to its rifts and crevices has a clear 
phenomenological valence; Levinas’s phenomenology no less enjoins this critical stance, 
and offers an array of  phenomenological tools to make good on it. Insofar as the critical 
phenomenology practiced in the light of  redemption refers to an eschatological future, we 
can call it a critical phenomenological eschatology, or simply critical eschatology. 
 Following both Levinas and Adorno, such a critical eschatology must be ready to 
subject itself  to its own critique. For Levinas, the infinite which stands beyond totality must 
nonetheless reflect itself  within totality, and only by so doing can it draw us to the point at 
which totality breaks down; our efforts in this regard, being forever finite and fallible, may 
always fall prey to the totalities in which they must be reflected. For Adorno, critique is 
conditioned by the damaged world at which it is aimed, and is thus marked by the very 
14 An exemplary contemporary instance of  this self-critique at work in critical theory would be Allen 
(2017), which is helpfully held up as a model for critical phenomenology in Salamon (2018a).
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imperfections it theorizes. This is not a defeatism on either Levinas’s or Adorno’s part, but 
rather a demand that we redouble our critical efforts, never succumbing to the contentment 
of  “good conscience” at having ostensibly completed our task once and for all. As far as 
either Levinas or Adorno are concerned (as far as either of  them can surmise from the 
present state of  things), the task cannot nor ever will be completed— redemption remains a 
future always just beyond the horizon, whose very unreachability ensures that the work of  
critical eschatology will never come to rest. For Levinas, messianic peace is not a final end 
to history, but a call to our responsibilities towards the Other here and now. For Adorno, 
the reality or unreality of  redemption hardly matters, only the demand it places on us in 
the present. Again, far from defeatism, this is a redoubling of  our critical eschatological 
efforts, necessary if  critical eschatology is to be true to its own cause. As long as the light 
of  redemption shines on our suffering and despair, critical eschatology can and must set to 
work.
CONCLUSION
By way of  conclusion, let us recapitulate the results of  the foregoing investigation. For 
both Levinas and Adorno, our fundamental ethical responsibilities are towards that which 
exceeds philosophical totalization or systematization (the Other or the non-identical), whose 
suffering under the domination of  totality or systematicity (the Same or identity) we must 
give voice to and struggle to eliminate. For both Levinas and Adorno, we are obligated to put 
an end to the suffering of  others, not to seek a purported philosophical justification for such 
suffering—as the classical philosophical project of  theodicy has sought to do. The historical 
catastrophes of  the 20th century have repudiated theodicy: the memories of  the victims—
including all those who continue to fall victim to injustice anew every day—instead call us 
to take up our responsibility to fight against present oppression and domination in favour 
of  a better future. For both Levinas and Adorno, the methodological tool proper to these 
concerns is the “light of  redemption” (the messianic light, the standpoint of  redemption or 
the eschatology of  messianic peace). To see all things as they would appear in the light of  
redemption is to see clearly and distinctly the manifold totalities, structures, and systems of  
domination, oppression, and injustice in the present world, revealing all the ways in which 
the present world is utterly distorted and indigent in comparison to a would-be redemptive 
future. Even if  this redemption can only be negatively specified in relation to the despair of  
the present, even if  this redemption may never come, its light still shines—and all the more 
brightly—for we the unredeemed. 
  Insofar as Levinas’s phenomenology and Adorno’s critical theory both take up this 
eschatological standpoint, they can both be said to evince a certain “critical eschatology” with 
promising possibilities for critical phenomenology. The task of  a critical phenomenological 
eschatology would be, first of  all, to lend a voice to suffering by articulating the experiences 
of  intolerable objective conditions weighing on the subject (in Adorno’s terms), or of  
totalities weighing on the Other (in Levinas’s terms). Such critical phenomenological work 
would be critical inasmuch as it steadfastly refuses reconciliation with an unjust present 
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(Adorno) and any purportedly rational justification for the useless suffering that our world 
produces and re-produces (Levinas). The light of  redemption illuminates phenomena for 
critical phenomenological analysis oriented at its most fundamental level towards a critique 
of  the present and the struggle for a more ethical, more just, more flourishing future for 
us all.15 Of  course, this comparison between Levinas and Adorno has only just scratched 
the surface of  a critical phenomenology of  this kind; I take myself  only to have laid the 
groundwork for further research in this regard by drawing attention to certain points of  
mutual agreement or resonance between the two. Further work would also be needed to 
explore the various crucial and productive differences between Levinas and Adorno in 
greater detail; I have only emphasized their similarities for the sake of  making particularly 
salient the possibilities for mutual illumination and enrichment between these two epochal 
thinkers. 
As a coda of  sorts, I give the final enigmatic words to two other thinkers of  our unredeemed 
condition and of  a messianic redemption. First, to Walter Benjamin (1969): 
Our image of  happiness is indissolubly bound up with the image 
of  redemption. The same applies to our view of  the past, which is 
the concern of  history. The past carries with it a temporal index 
by which it is referred to redemption. There is a secret agreement 
between past generations and the present one. Our coming was 
expected on earth. Like every generation that preceded us, we have 
been endowed with a weak Messianic power, a power to which the 
past has a claim. That claim cannot be settled cheaply. (254)
Second, to the always paradoxical Franz Kafka (1958): “The Messiah will come only when 
he is no longer necessary; he will come only on the day after his arrival” (80-81).
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